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SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF FEDERALISM
IN THE FIELD OF LABOR RELATIONS
The price of Federalism is conflict. This conflict arises in virtu-
ally every field of federal regulation and is not peculiar only to the
field of labor relations. The respective areas in which the state and
federal governments may act concurrently or exclusively is not al-
ways clear. The general rule is that if the federal government has
preempted the field relating to or affecting interstate commerce, the
power of the state to act no longer exists. An examination of some
of the early cases in our constitutional history will show that the cur-
rent problems in the field of labor relations are not new problems
at all. These cases reveal that an affirmative grant to Congress of
power to regulate interstate commerce, coupled with the federal
supremacy clause, will enable Congress to close the door completely
to state regulation. The problem then becomes one of determining
whether or not Congress has clearly manifested an intention either
to permit or to preclude state regulation.
In some cases, however, when Congress undertakes to regulate a
field in which the states had been previously free to regulate, Con-
gress manifests no clear intention as to the surviving line of demar-
-cation between state and federal power to act.
The enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act),1 and to an even greater extent, its amendment by the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley),2 both of which regulate
labor relations in the field of interstate commerce, has given rise to
serious questions as to whether, and to what extent, such labor re-
lations are still subject to the regulatory powers of the states. The
cases which have arisen during the history of the above acts are not
in harmony on the question whether and to what extent a state can
act in certain factual situations.
Among the leading controversies are the following:
(1) The authority of state courts to grant relief against secon-
dary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes and coercive union picket-
ing.
(2) The authority of state courts to enjoin peaceful picketing.
(3) The jurisdiction of state boards to entertain representation
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 151 et. seq. (1956), (hereafter referred to
as Wagner Act or N.L.R.A.).
2. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141 et. seq. (1956), (hereafter referred to
as Taft-Hartley Act or L.M.R.A.).
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and unfair labor practice cases affecting establishments with-
in their borders whose operations affect interstate commerce.
(4) The propriety of the policies of the National Labor Relations
Board (N.L.R.B.) in declining jurisdiction over small enter-
prises having a relatively slight impact upon interstate com-
merce.
(5) The power of a state legislature to prevent interruptions of
public utility services by law providing for seizure or com-
pulsory arbitration.
The purpose of this article is to present the leading decisions on
some of the above conflicts which have arisen under the N.L.R.A.
and L.M.R.A. Emphasis will be placed on recent cases which are
in conflict as to whether a state has jurisdiction.
I. The Basis of the Doctrine of Preemption
The general doctrine of preemption developed under Article VI
of the United States' Constitution, the supremacy clause, is that when
Congress passes a law on a matter within its jurisdiction it "preempts
the field" and deprives the states of jurisdiction regardless of whether
the states' laws are in coincidence with, complementary to or in oppo-
sition to federal law.
The United States Supreme Court faced this issue for the first
time in 1820. 3 In Houston v. Moore, the court repudiated what it
described as the novel and unconstitutional doctrine, that in cases
where the state governments have a concurrent power of legislation
with the national government, the state may legislate upon any sub-
ject on which Congress has acted, provided the laws are not contra-
dictory and repugnant to each other. The heart of the matter as this
court saw it was that the Congressional legislation goes as far as the
Congress "thought right." This was true even though important pro-
visions have been omitted from an act, or that other provisions which
were included might have been more extensive or more wisely drawn.
Since Congress presumably did not intend to sanction such opposi-
tion, the will of Congress is ascertained as well by what the legisla-
ture has not declared, as by what they have expressed. This de-
cision remains as the foundation of the doctrine of "preemption"
or "occupation of the field" doctrine and has been approved through
the years.
4
However, as the national economy grew and more federal regula-
tions were required, this presumption that Congress had preempted
3. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1820).
4. Charleston and Carolina Railroad Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S.
597 (1915).
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the field did not settle all of the problems. Often, for example, Con-
gress chose to regulate only a limited portion of a particular field.
This caused perplexing questions of jurisdiction to arise. If Con-
gress had not decided or even considered what substantive regula-
tions would be appropriate in other portions of the field, there
should be no reason for applying the presumption that by failing to
regulate comprehensively, Congress intended to leave the balance
entirely free from state control. The more reasonable assumption
would be that Congress chose to regulate only partially, precisely
because it felt that state regulation of the balance of the field was
adequate and, therefore, federal regulation was not required. 5 In
this area the familiar rule was laid down that the intent to supersede
the exercise by the state of its police power is not to be inferred
but must be clearly manifested.
6
The Supreme Court has further stated, however, that Congress
need make no express reference to the question of state law or
jurisdiction, but the operation of state law and state agencies will be
excluded by implication if the federal enactment indicates an intent
to provide a uniform rule.
7
A final facet of this brief outline of the doctrine of preemption
remains. Assuming that Congress expressly or by implication pre-
served to the states the right to legislate in an area, nevertheless such
legislation may not be applied if the state regulation in any way
conflicts with or is inconsistent with the federal legislation.8 This
theory here again reflects a presumption that Congress did not intend
to sanction state action in any field which stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.9
In many of the decisions in which the United States Supreme
Court has arrived at a solution to the vexing problems created by
the division of governmental powers, the court has spoken about the
Congressional intent to occupy the field and has made fine distinctions
which at times border on the metaphysical.' 0 Thus, it is clear that
whenever Congress legislates in a new field previously occupied sole-
ly by the states, grave questions will arise as to the validity of state
regulation, unless Congress makes its intention dear. Although the
5. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) ; South Caro-
lina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
6. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
7. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
8. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
9. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
10. Polish National Alliance v. N.L.R.B., 322 U.S. 643 (1943).
[Vol. 9
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above principles of preemption won't settle any of these problems,
their application to the field of labor relations should come as no
surprise.
II. Conflicts Which Arose Under the Wagner Act
Prior to 1937 when the Supreme Court sustained the constitu-
tionality of the N.L.R.A., n the assumption was that only the states
had authority to regulate labor relations in manufacturing and min-
ing industries, even though the products of these industries enter the
channels of interstate commerce.
12
The N.L.R.A. undertook to deal with the improper practices on
the part of employers which deprived employees and unions of their
rights. Since most of the state legislation was in the field of union
unfair labor practices the question of jurisdiction of state courts
rarely arose except in representation cases.
The power of the N.L.R.B. to prevent the unfair labor practices
enumerated in section 8 of the N.L.R.A. was set forth in section
10(a) which stated that:
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practices (listed in section
8) affecting commerce. This power shall be exclusive and shall not
be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise."' 3
With the possible exception of the reference to "exclusive jurisdic-
tion" of the N.L.R.B. in section 10(a) of the N.L.R.A. no guides
to its construction were laid down by Congress. Furthermore the
language in 10(a) was not intended by Congress to vest exclusive
jurisdiction in the N.L.R.B. as against the labor boards of the states.
The leading cases which arose under the N.L.R.A. support the
above conclusions. In one of these early cases, the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board found that the union had engaged in mass
picketing, threatening employees, picketing their domiciles and ob-
structing factory entrances and the free use of the streets; this con-
duct was an unfair labor practice under the Wisconsin Act.14 The
Wisconsin board ordered the union to cease and desist from this
conduct. The question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the enactment of the N.L.R.A. excluded regulation of such
activity by the Wisconsin board. The Supreme Court affirmed say-
ing:
11. N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
12. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
13. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1956).
14. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S.
740 (1942).
1957]
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The federal act was not designed to preclude a state from enacting
legislation limited to the prohibition of this type of activity. The
committee reports on the federal act plainly indicate that it is not
"a mere police court measure" and that authority of the several states
may be exerted to control such conduct. Furthermore, this court
has long insisted that "an intention of Congress to exclude states
from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested." Con-
gress has not made such employee conduct as is involved in this case
subject to regulation by the federal board. If the order of the state
board affected the status of the employees or if it caused a forfeiture
of collective bargaining rights, a distinctly different question would
arise. Since no such right is affected we conclude that this case is
not basically different from the common situation where a state takes
steps to prevent breaches of the peace in connection with labor dis-
putes. We cannot say that the mere enactment of the N.L.R.A.
without more excluded state regulation of the type which Wisconsin
has exercised in this case. It has not been shown that any employee
was deprived of rights protected or granted by the federal act or
that the status of any of them under the federal act was impaired.
Indeed if the portions of the state act here invoked are invalid be-
cause they conflict with the federal act, then so long as the federal
act is on the books it is difficult to see how any state could under
any circumstance regulate picketing or disorder growing out of la-
bor disputes of companies whose business affects interstate commerce.
However, there can be no state action which impairs, dilutes, quali-
fies or subtracts from the rights guaranteed by the N.L.R.A.
One should note here, that the company in the above case was sub-
ject to the N.L.R.A. and also that the N.L.R.B. had not undertaken
to exercise the jurisdiction which that act conferred on it.
In a later case,15 however, the United States Supreme Court struck
down a Florida statute which required business agents to obtain li-
censes as a condition precedent to representation of any employee
group and also required the filing of certain information returns, in
default of which the unions could be enjoined. The majority of the
court felt that the police power of the state had to yield to the federal
policy that employees should have a free and untrammeled choice in
the selection of their bargaining agents.
Both of the above cases deal with the problem of what state laws
are in conflict with the N.L.R.A. An implication from these two de-
cisions is that state labor boards would have concurrent jurisdiction
even over interstate businesses so long as the N.L.R.B. did not exer-
15. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 740 (1945).
[Vol. 9
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cise its jurisdiction and so long as the state law was not contrary to
the N.L.R.A.
The next problem which should logically be considered is whether
a state law which conformed to the N.L.R.A. might also be invalid.
New York early passed a "baby Wagner Act" and reached the con-
clusion that where there was no conflict between the state and federal
act, the exercise of jurisdiction by the state board was propero
l6
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court in a leading decision
seemed to destroy any doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction which
existed.17 This was the first case under the N.L.R.A. which called
for invocation of the preemption presumption theory. The Bethle-
hem Steel Company v. New York State Labor Relations Board c e
arose as a result of state intervention in the matter of recognition of
foremen's unions. In this case the board undertook to certify bar-
gaining agents for units of supervisors. Congress had not itself decid-
ed at that time whether supervisors should constitute appropriate bar-
gaining units, but it had delegated to the N.L.R.B. power to decide
that question. Although at the time the state board originally acted
the N.L.R.B. had been of the opinion that units composed of super-
visors were inappropriate, by the time the case reached the United
States Supreme Court, the national board's view had changed. Since
then, there was no conflict between the order of the New York board
and the policy of the N.L.R.B., the question presented was whether
by delegating to the N.L.R.B. power to decide questions concerning
representation involving supervisors, Congress had occupied that
field to the exclusion of state authority.
In declaring that the order of the New York board was beyond its
authority, the court might have rested the case on the ground that
the construction given by the state board to its own statute created
a conflict between the act and the federal law. Here, however, his-
tory provided the guide.' 8 Mr. Justice Jackson speaking for the
court said that because the duty of the employer to bargain with
labor organizations was defined in the N.L.R.A., Congress had in-
tended to preempt the field so far as making such a legal obligation,
and therefore the states lacked any power to enforce the same obli-
gation upon a business subject to the N.L.R.A.
The court used the following language with regard to the certifica-
tion by the state board:
16. Davega-City Radio v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 281 N.Y.
13, 22 N.E. 2d 145 (1939).
17. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 331 U.S.
767 (1946).
18. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1820).
1957]
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"The state argues for a rule that would enable it to act until the
federal board had acted in the same case. But we do not think that a
case by case test of federal supremacy is permissible here. The
federal board has jurisdiction of the industry in which these par-
ticular employees are engaged and has asserted control of their labor
relations in general. We do not believe this leaves room for the
operation of the state authority asserted."
"The National and State Boards have made a commendable effort
to avoid conflict in this overlapping state of the statutes. We find
nothing in their obligations, however, which affects either the con-
struction of the federal statute or the question of constitutional pow-
er insofar as they are involved in the case since the national board
made no concession or delegation of power to deal with this subject.
The election of the national board to decline jurisdiction in certain
types of cases for budgetary or other reasons presents a different
problem which we do not now decide."'19
The above language and the reasoning of the court was so vague
that interpretations of the decisions by the states were often diame-
trically opposed. There was some belief that the decision prohibited
all state action in industries affecting commerce with respect to re-
presentation proceedings and unfair labor practices. 20 On the other
hand, the Wisconsin view was that the concurrent jurisdiction of its
state board was unchanged.2 1
In La Crosse Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Enmployneent
Relations Board, a labor organization had filed a petition for certifi-
cation with the N.L.R.B. while the negotiations were pending be-
tween management and labor for renegotiation of a contract. The
union withdrew its petition from the national board before the latter
had acted upon it and filed the petition for certification with the Wis-
consin board. The Wisconsin act was different from the N.L.R.A.
with respect to the procedure to be followed in determining the bar-
gaining unit. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Wis-
consin Supreme Court citing the Bethlehem Steel Company case
saying:
We went on to point out that the national board had jurisdiction
of the industry in which the particular employers were engaged and
asserted control of their labor relations in general. Both the state
and federal statutes had laid hold of the same relationship and had
19. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767,776 (1946).
20. Pittsburgh Railway Operators, 357 Pa. 379, 54 A. 2d 891 (1947).
21. La Crosse Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 18 (1947).
[Vol. 9
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provided different standards for its regulation. Since the employers
in question were subject to regulation by the N.L.R.B., we thought
the situation too fraught with potential conflict to permit the intru-
sion of the state agency, even though the N.L.R.B. had not acted in
the particular cases before us.
There was much speculation after the Bethlehem Steel and La
Crosse Telephone cases as to just when the Supreme Court intended
to bar state action. What this speculation overlooked was that the
presumption of Congressional occupancy of the regulated field under-
lie the Supreme Court holdings in both cases. In a later case the
Supreme Court made this underlying premise explicit when it referred
to the N.L.R.A. as an instance in which Congress had acted so un-
equivocably as to make clear that it intends no regulation except its
own.
22
The serious problem not solved by any of the above cases is the
result when the N.L.R.B. declines jurisdiction, then can the state
board act in a manner which is consistent with the N.L.R.A. Al-
though the Supreme Court in the Bethlehem Steel case2s by way
of dicta indicated that state boards might act where the N.L.R.B.
has specifically delegated jurisdiction, or where budgetary, workload
or other considerations prevent such actions, it is by no means clear
that such delegation will be countenanced by the Supreme Court.
From the above cases, the law as it existed in 1947 when Congress
passed the L.M.R.A. may be summarized as follows:
State legislatures still had power to restrict or forbid compulsory
union membership agreements 24 and state courts still had jurisdic-
tion to grant relief against such union misconduct as violence, threats,
trespass and mass picketing. The states, however, were not free to
confer on state agencies or state courts concurrent jurisdiction in the
field of unfair labor practices by employers, nor to pass any legisla-
tion which interfered with the rights of employees to engage in
peaceful concerted activities or the selection of bargaining represen-
tatives.
III. Conflicts Which Arose Under the Taft-Hartley Act
Unlike the N.L.R.A. in which Congress dealt only with the pro-
tection of the right of employees to organize and to engage in con-
certed activities for mutual aid or protection, the L.M.R.A. governs
22. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corporation, 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
23. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767,
776 (1946).
24. Algoma Plywood v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
301 (1949).
1957]
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the entire field of labor-management relations. The Congressional.
intent is best reflected in the preamble to the L.M.R.A. which de-
clares "that it is the purpose and policy of the act to prescribe the
legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations
affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of
the other to protect the rights of individual employees in their rela-
tions with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce and
are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the
public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce." 25
In enacting the L.M.R.A., Congress took into account some of the
problems of overlapping state and federal jurisdiction. The act ex-
pressly provided in section 14(b) that the states were still authorized
to prevent any form of compulsory unionism. In section 14(a), the
act expressly states that under no state law could supervisors be
treated as employees for the purpose of any statute relating to collec-
tive bargaining. One of the most important sections of the act from
the standpoint of the federalism problem is 10(a) which states:
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section
8) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law or otherwise: Provided, That the
Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any state or
territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any
industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and
transportation except where predominantly local in character) even
though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce,
unless the provision of the state or territorial statute applicable to
the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with
the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a construc-
tion inconsistent therewith."
2 6
While there are other references to state action found in the act,
2 7
Congress was silent as to other matters on which conflicts with state
law had arisen or were likely to arise.
Since under the L.M.R.A. the federal government for the first
time entered seriously into the field of regulating strikes and other
union activities, the cases became more numerous in which the ques-
25. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141(b) (1956).
26. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1956). This provision has never
been utilized as no state has ever conformed its own labor relations legislation
to the L.M.R.A.
27. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(d), 163, 173 and 187 (1952).
[Vol. 9
9
Parler: Some Aspects of the Problem of Federalism in the Field of Labor R
Published by Scholar Commons, 1957
LAW NoTEs
tion of federal supremacy was raised. Under the L.M.R.A., there
was more to support the theory that Congress had intended to occupy
this field to the exclusion of the states than the doctrine of preemp-
tion.28  First of all, the legislative history of the L.M.R.A. shows
that Congress investigated, accepted and rejected certain proposals
from one end to the other of the field of labor-management relations.
From the prior decisions under the N.L.R.A., Congress knew full
well that labor legislation preempts the field which the act covers in-
sofar as commerce within the meaning of the act is concerned.2 9 Con-
gress devoted much time during the debate of the L.M.R.A. as to the
extent to which its contemplated action should supersede state legis-
lation. During debate on the measure in the House, the suggestion
was made that the act should contain a provision which would pre-
serve the constitutionality of the state laws in this field. This sugges-
tion was abandoned when it was stated that to preserve "states
rights" in this field would nullify much of the bill.30
Therefore, since Congress was aware of the preemption problem, it
took care to reserve for state action only those areas in the L.M.R.A.
which provide that state regulations could be operative. 31 Labor
unions which were publicly denouncing the L.M.R.A. as a slave-labor
law nevertheless seized upon its provisions as a possible means of
avoiding the effects of all state restrictions by contending that the
L.M.R.A. had preempted the entire field of regulation of unions.
32
Thus, in Plankinton v. Wisconsin State Labor Board, the United
States Supreme Court invalidated an order of the Wisconsin board
which directed an employer to reinstate a worker whom the union
had blackballed and whose discharge had been brought about through
union instigation."3 This case stands for the proposition that states
may not regulate in respect to rights guaranteed by Congress in sec-
tion 7 of the L.M.R.A. United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien
34
involved an attempt to enforce a state law which required a state-
supervised secret ballot vote as a condition precedent to a strike.
The defendant union conducted a strike for a new contract for in-
creased wages and improved working conditions without complying
with the state law. This strike was found to be concerted activity
28. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1820).
29. H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1947).
30. 93 Cong. Rec. 3559 (1947) ; California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
31. 93 Cong. Rec. 3453, 6519, 6532 (1947).
32. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(b) (1956).
33. Plankinton Packington Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
338 U.S. 753 (1949).
34. United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
19571
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within section 7 and was thus protected from interference by the
state.
However, the concept also developed that states are free to
treat under their own policies any concerted activities which are
neither protected nor prohibited by the L.M.R.A. 35  In such a case,
the United States Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin court was
entitled to enjoin a program of "quickie" strikes which it described
as a novel technique of bringing pressure to bear upon employers.
It held that the objectives only and not the tactics of a strike bring
it within the power of the N.L.R.A. This decision, by its distinc-
tion of motives from tactics, recognizes that when the motive of con-
certed activity is in issue, the matter is covered by the L.M.R.A., to
the exclusion of state action.
Another area of conflict which developed was in the field of peace-
ful conduct, including picketing for organizational purposes.
36 A
proposed section in the L.M.R.A. would have barred peaceful picket-
ing in such broad terms as to include picketing by strangers or unions
not representative of a majority of the employees. Such a proposal
was debated and rejected.
3 7
The next problem area deserving of consideration was the effect
of the L.M.R.A. upon the power of state courts to restrain activities
which were enumerated as unfair labor practices as distinguished
from the cases discussed so far which have state action in conflict
with or not covered by the act.
In this area, although the N.L.R.B. is authorized to obtain an in-
junction against picket line violence on the ground that it interferes
with the right of employees to refrain from participating in con-
certed activity, the states remain free to prohibit and to punish such
conduct to preserve the peace. 38 In areas other than violence, cases
have held that the fact of Taft-Hartley's application to and prohibi-
tion of the acts alleged, is of itself sufficient to deny the applicability
or relevance of state law covering the same act.39 However, some
cases also held that even though an act was an unfair labor practice
under section 8 of the L.M.R.A., still the state court could grant re-
35. United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 245 (1948).
36. Goodwin's Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. 2d 697 (1951).
37. Section 12(a) of Representative Hartley's House bill, 93 Cong. Rec.
3558, 3586, 3736 (1947).
38. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S.
740 (1942); U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245
(1949); Erwin Mills Inc. v. Textile Worker's Union, 234 N.C. 321, 67 S.E. 2d
372 (1951).
39. Direct Transit Lines v. Teamster's Union, 199 F. 2d 89 (6th Cir. 1952).
[Vol. 9
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lief on the theory that the alleged acts involved were a tort under
state law.
40
The above are only a few of the many cases which illustrate the
nature of the conflicts and the manner in which the state courts re-
acted to them. In 1953, the United States Supreme Court handed
down a famous decision which served to clear up some of these con-
flicts.4 1 In Joseph Garnter v. Teamsters Local No. 776, petitioners
sought an injunction in the Pennsylvania State Court against certain
picketing by the defendant union. Four of petitioner's twenty-four
employees were members of the union, and petitioner had no objec-
tion to the rest becoming members. No controversy, strike or labor
dispute was in progress. The picketing was orderly and peaceful, but
other drivers refused to cross the picket line so that the petitioner's
business was brought almost to a standstill. The Court granted the
injunction on the ground that the purpose of the picketing was to
coerce petitioner into compelling his employees to join the union, which
violated the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act.42 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reversed the injunction stating :3
"In our opinion such provisions for a comprehensive remedy pre-
cluded any state action by way of a different or additional remedy for
the correction of the identical grievance."
The court, of course, was referring to the remedies provided by
the L.M.R.A. Affirming the United States Supreme Court said :44
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be
enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the
parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and applica-
tion of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and
prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and no-
tice, hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final
administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized
administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to ob-
tain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid diversi-
ties and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures
and attitudes toward labor controversies. A multiplicity of tribunals
and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible
or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.
The same reasoning which prohibits federal courts from intervening
40. Art Steel Co. v. Velazquez, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 793 (1952)
41. Joseph Garner v. Teamster's Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
42. Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 43, 211 (1954).
43. 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. 2d 893 (1953).
44. Joseph Garner v. Teamster's Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 489 (1953).
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in such cases, except by way of review or on application of the feder-
al board, precludes state courts from doing so.
The court further declared :45
"Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening of employees, ob-
structing streets and highways, or picketing homes. We have held
that the state still may exercise its historic powers over such tradi-
tionally lozal matters as public safety and order and the use of streets
and highways. Nothing suggests that the activity enjoined threat-
ened a probably breach of the states' peace as would call for extra-
ordinary police measures by state or city authority."
Labor unions hailed this decision as emancipating them from hav-
ing to try their cases in state courts. However, the Garner case by
no means settled the problems of conflicts. The important problem
not answered by the Supreme Court is the power of the state to act
when the N.L.R.B. has declined jurisdiction. Recent cases dealing
with this problem will be discussed in a later section. Until this
problem is settled by the Supreme Court there will continue to exist
that unoccupied no man's land in the field of labor relations which
occurs when the N.L.R.B. declines jurisdiction and the state refuses
to assert jurisdiction on the theory that the L.M.R.A. has preempted
the field.
Shortly after the Garner case, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed a decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals which
indicated that the Supreme Court had adopted a more moderate posi-
tion on the question of state jurisdiction.46 In United Construction
Workers v. Laburnuin Construction Corporation, plaintiff, a build-
ing contractor who was admittedly operating in interstate commerce,
had a mutually satisfactory agreement with an A.F.L. union. An-
other union by violent conduct intimidated the employees of the
plaintiff until they quit their jobs, thus causing the plaintiff to default
on his contract and suffer heavy losses. The plaintiff recovered in a
common-law tort action against the union in a state court. The
United States Supreme Court pointed out that Congress had not pro-
vided any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for
money damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct.
47
Another leading case presented the question, in view of the fact that
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter was in the N.L.R.B.,
could the federal Fourt, on application of the N.L.R.B., enjoin peti-
tioners from enforcing an injunction already obtained from the state
45. Joseph Garner v. Teamster's Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 487 (1953).
46. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corporation, 347
U.S. 656 (1954).
47. See Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E. 2d 729 (1955).
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court.48  In the state court, 49 petitioner had obtained a restraining
order restraining defendant union from peacefully picketing pursuant
to a labor dispute between the parties. An unfair labor practice
charge having been filed with the N.L.R.B., the purpose of the re-
straining order was to maintain the status quo pending the outcome
of the complaint.
The United States Distrit Court. for the Southern District of
California granted a preliminary injunction which restrained the em-
ployer from enforcing the injunction. The United States Court of
_Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction
saying:
"The boycott of the product of Service's bakers to restrain their
opposition to and compel their unionization is prohibited by section
8(b) (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act. We think Congress has preempted
this function to the National Labor Relations Board and that the
state court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction."
5 0
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 51
In summary, the main effects of the above cases are, first, the
federal government has preempted the field insofar as unfair labor
practices involving interstate commerce are concerned, thus state
courts and state agencies have no jurisdiction over such cases; second,
the state court may properly take jurisdiction and enjoin any picket-
ing connected with violence; third, individuals may bring a tort ac-
tion in a state court for damages caused by some act which was also
an unfair labor practice; fourth, N.L.R.B. can protect its jurisdic-
tion by federal court injunction. The unanswered question is whether
a state court can act when the N.L.R.B. declines jurisdiction in the
area where it clearly has the power to exercise jurisdiction.
The Garner decision removed all doubt from the long standing
principle that absent violence, there can be no state control of' labor
disputes falling within the scope of national labor legislation. The
next point of investigation is the effect of this decision on state action
thereafter.
IV. Cases Since the Garner Case Which Hold That a State Cannot
Assert Jurisdiction
In Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Company, the
United States Supreme Court reversed a judgment by the Supreme
Court of Alabama which had granted injunctive relief against picket-
48. Capital Service Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
49. See 204 F. 2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1953).
50. Id. at 851.
51. Capital Service Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
1957]
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1957], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss2/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERILY
ing which was an unfair labor practice.52 The Supreme Court held
that it was unnecessary to decide whether the state court would have
jurisdiction to grant relief in such case if the N.L.R.B. should decline
to exercise its jurisdiction, since there was no clear showing that ap-
plication for r'elief, had been made or that it would have been futile
to make such application.
In a later case, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that the state
court was without jurisdiction to enjoin picketing which amounted to
unfair labor practices absent violence.53 Where a labor dispute af-
fects interstate commerce, the Alabama court held that the L.M.R.A.
vests exclusive jurisdiction to regulate such disputes in the N.L.R.B.
In the Anheuser-Busch case,5 4 the United States Supreme Court
held that the state courts of Missouri were without authority to en-
join strike action which resulted from an interunion dispute and
which, according to employer's state court complaint violated both
the state's secondary boycott laws and sections of the L.M.R.A.; the
complaint also alleged that the acts were in conflict with state laws
against conspiracies in restraint of trade. Before filing the state
court complaint, the employer bad filed unfair labor practice charges
under section 8(b) (4) (D) of the L.M.R.A. The N.L.R.B. found,
however, that no jurisdictional dispute existed within the meaning of
that section of the L.M.R.A. According to the United States Su-
preme Court, the Missouri court could not, under these circumstances,
predicate the exercise of their powers on the assumption that the
N.L.R.B. had ruled that there was no unfair labor practice under the
L.M.R.A. The court pointed out that all the N.L.R.B. determined
was that there was no violation of section 8(b) (4) (d) which was the
only unfair labor practice charged. This determination, in the court's
view, could not be construed as a holding that there was also no vio-
lation of sections 8(b) (4) (a) and (b) such as the employer bad al-
leged in the complaint filed in the state court. Moreover, the court
said, even if it had been clear that no violation of any of the
L.M.R.A.'s unfair labor practice provisions was involved, the state
court was nevertheless not free to issue an injunction. The court
observed that a finding that the conduct was outside the prohibitions
of section 8 of the L.M.R.A. left undetermined the further question
whether the conduct came within the protection of section 755 as a
concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. The
52. Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954).
53. Montgomery Building and Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erec-
tion Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57 So. 2d 112 (1951).
54. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Inc. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
55. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 157 (1956).
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court also rejected the contention that the Missouri courts injunction
was proper because it vindicated a state law which was not concerned
with labor relations. The court made it clear that under the rules of
the Garner and Capital Service cases, the exact category of public
policy violated by the conduct enjoined is not a decisive factor. The
court said that controlling and therefore superseding federal power
cannot be curtailed by the state even though the ground of interven-
tion be different from that on which federal supremacy has been
exercised. Seemingly this prenumbral area can be rendered progres-
sively clear only by the course of litigation.
As a result of the above decision, the conclusion must be that the
L.M.R.A. precludes a state from enjoining strikes, boycotts or picket-
ing on the ground that the objective is unlawful in the sense that the
union or employees are not justified in injuring the employer's busi-
ness for such a purpose.
Referring to its ruling in the Anheuser-Busch case, the United
States Supreme Court in General Driver's Local No. 89 v. American
Tobacco Company,56 likewise held that an injunction issued by a
Kentucky court against certain picketing activities was an invasion
of an area reserved to federal authority by the L.M.R.A. The state
court injunction here had the effect of requiring members of the
picketing union, who were employed by certain common and contract
carriers, to cross a picket line established by their union at the pre-
mises of one of the carriers and the picketing union expressly per-
mitted the carrier's drivers to respect picket lines of their union. The
Supreme Court held that the law of Kentucky which requires com-
mon carriers to serve the public without discrimination afforded no
basis for the invasion of the federally preempted field.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Washington denied the
plaintiff injunctive relief against peaceful picketing in a state court.5 7
None of relator's eighty-two employees was a member of any of the
defendant unions. The purpose of the picketing was for the purpose
of forcing the employer to compel his employees to join one of the
picketing unions. The state supreme court held that the N.L.R.B.
has exclusive jurisdiction to prevent such picketing since it was an
unfair labor practice under the L.M.R.A. The court further held
that the fact that none of the employees were members of the unions
as in the Garner case was immaterial because the N.L.R.B. is em-
56. General Drivers Local No. 89 v. American Tobacco Co., 348 U.S. 978
(1955).
57. Stoddard-Wendle Motor Co. v. Automotive Machinists Lodge, 295 P.
2d 305 (Wash. 1956).
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powered to prevent any unfair labor practice affecting commerce. 58
In a recent case, 59 the California Supreme Court affirmed the rul-
ing of a lower court in refusing to grant an injunction against de-
fendant union in an action brought under the California Jurisdiction-
al Strike Act.60 In refusing to grant the injunction, the trial court
refused to follow an earlier California decision6 l in view of the sub-
sequent holdings of the United States Supreme Court.62  The trial
court adopted the view that in labor matters, where the employer is
engaged in interstate commerce, state courts do not have jurisdiction
to issue injunctions except in the exercise of the police power of the
state. The court further quoted with approval the following language
of a case which was unpopular prior to the Garner case :6s
"A state court has no jurisdiction to enjoin, at the instance of an
employer engaged in interstate commerce, the picketing of the em-
ployer's premises, delaying the construction of an oil terminal, where
the picketing was conducted for one of the following purposes: coerc-
ing the employer to sign closed shop contracts with the defendant
unions; coercing the employees to become members of these unions,
even though the employees voted in an election conducted by the
federal board, against joining the unions involved; inducing the em-
ployees of another employer (not involved in the litigation) to engage
in a concerted refusal to perform services in the course of their em-
ployment at the plaintiff employer's oil terminal for the purpose of
forcing again other employers (likewise not involved in the litiga-
tion) to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services in the
course of their employment at the plaintiff employer's oil terminal
for the purpose of forcing again other employers (likewise not in-
volved in the present litigation) to recognize the defendant unions
as the representatives of their employees, even, though such unions
have not been certified by the federal board."
A review of the above cases would lead to the conclusion that since
the Garner decision, the function of states in labor-management situa-
tions has been limited to areas where there is a breach or a threatened
breach of the peace. These functions referred to are those other
than the ones specifically authorized by the L.M.R.A. such as the
state "right to work" laws.
58. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160 (1956).
59. Breidut Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers, 294 P. 2d 93 (Cal. 1955).
60. CAL. LAD. CODE 1115-1120.
61. Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, 40 Cal. 2d 392, 254 P. 2d 559 (1955).
62. Joseph Garner v. Teamster's Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Weber
v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
63. Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Building and Construction Trade
Council, 93 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Me. 1950).
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V. Cases Since the Garner Case TWhich Hold That a State Can Act
Where a state has authority under its police power to restrain
violent conduct which is also an unfair labor practice under the
L.M.R.A., it is immaterial whether the state exercises that authority
through its courts or through an administrative agency, such as a
state labor relations board.64 Cases referred to previously as being
illustrative of state power to act in this area will not be discussed
herein again.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state may enjoin
peaceful picketing when one of its substantial purposes is in conflict
with a state "right to work" statute, the policy of which is that the
right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account
of nonmembership in a labor union. 65 However, the picketing must
be carried on with at least one of its substantial purposes in conflict
with the declared state policy authorized in section 14(b).
66
Where a union excluded an employee from membership and caused
him loss of employment under a union-shop contract in an industry
affecting interstate commerce, it has been held that a state court
could not grant him injunctive relief, but that it could award him
damages. 67 The court said that although the back-pay award avail-
able from the N.L.R.B. is equivalent to the common-law damages
available in a court action, it can be granted by the N.L.R.B. only
as a supplement to and in aid of the preventive remedies of the
N.L.R.B., and therefore the employee may enforce his common-law
remedy in a state court. The court also noted that the state court
could not interfere with the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B., since the
employee had abandoned his rights before the N.L.R.B. by failing to
file and maintain charges within the six-month period allowed by
the L.M.R.A. statute of limitations ;68 therefore the N.L.R.B. could
grant no remedy with respect to that past conduct on the basis of any
new charge which the employee might file.
64. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S.
740 (1942); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954); U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
U.S. , 100 L. ed. 666 (1956) ; Clover Fork Coal Co. v. N.L.R.B., 97 F.
2d 331 (6th Cir. 1938). An act which does not affect interstate commerce is
within the jurisdiction of the state court.
65. American Federation of Labor v. Graham, 345 U.S. 191 (1952) ; Giboney
v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1948).
66. Gulf Shipside Storage Corp. v. Moore, 71 So. 2d 236 (La. 1955). Held
that the Louisiana court was without jurisdiction to enjoin picketing in viola-
tion of the Louisiana right to work law since the picketing was an unfair labor
practice under the L.M.R.A.
67. International Sound Technicians v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Coun-
ty, 30 Labor Cases 69, 987 (1956).
68. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160(b) (1956).
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In Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers,69 the
United States District Court for Northern Ohio had denied a union's
request to enjoin an employer with which it had a dispute from seek-
ing state court relief against picketing activities. The union asserted
that the employer's complaint in effect alleged a violation of the
L.M.R.A., therefore the Ohio state court could not assert jurisdic-
tion. The district court held itself without jurisdiction to grant re-
lief because of the provisions of section 2283 of title 28 of the United
States Code which prohibits federal injunctions against state court
proceedings. The exceptions to the prohibition, according to the
district court, did not apply. This decision was affirmed by a divid-
ed United States Supreme Court. The majority of that court took the
position that 28 U.S.C., section 2283, precludes federal courts from
granting the request of a private party to enjoin an attempt to secure
relief through state proceedings even though the labor activity in
question is outside state authority.
70
The most serious question still unanswered by the United States
Supreme Court is whether a state court can act so as to fill the juris-
dictional gaps created when the N.L.R.B. exercises its discretion to
refuse jurisdiction.7 1 There is a conflict in authority between the
states.72 A thorough review of these cases would be time consuming
and valueless. Rather, it is thought that a review of a recent Cali-
fornia case73 which is typical of the problems raised in this area
would be more practicable.
In Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Comucil defendant unions
picketed plaintiff and dissuaded customers of the plaintiff company
from purchasing supplies in order to force the plaintiff to sign a
closed shop contract. Previously the N.L.R.B. had refused to hold
a representation election because the plaintiff's interstate commerce
was insufficient to meet the N.L.R.B.'s discretionary standards. The
California Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the lower court
which had held that when the N.L.R.B. refuses jurisdiction over a
representation election between parties who are in interstate commerce,
the state court may assume jurisdiction and apply the L.M.R.A.
to an issue of unfair labor practices between the parties. The United
69. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America et. al. v. Richman Brothers,
348 U. S. 511 (1955).
70. Capital Service Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
71. Haselton Drug Stores v. N.L.R.B., 187 F. 2d 418 (8th Cir. 1951).
72. As to State Court not having jurisdiction see: Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board v. Teamsters Local 200, 66 N.W. 2d 318 (Wis. 1954).
As to State Court having jurisdiction see: Your Food Stores of Sante Fe v.
Retail Clerks Local 1564, 124 F. Supp. 697 (D.C. N.M. 1954).
73. Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 291 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1955).
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States Supreme Court has this decision before it at the present time.
The Utah Supreme Court recently held that if the N.L.R.B. de-
clines jurisdiction then the state board has the power to entertain an
unfair labor practice proceeding under the state labor act.1 4 The
theory of the Utah court was that since the N.L.R.B. had declined
jurisdiction, the employer's operations were predominantly local
in character and that it would not effectuate the policy7 5 of the
L..M.R.A. for the N.L.R.B. to exercise jurisdiction.
Another case which is before the United States Supreme Court
during the fall 1956 term is an Arkansas decision in which the state
Supreme Court held that the State could enjoin picketing which was
conducted in a manner unlawful under state law.76 The court so held
even though unfair labor practice proceedings were pending before the
N.L.R.B. Here, however, the picketing was accompanied by acts of
intimidation, threats, abuse, insults, destruction of property and
breaches of the peace. Therefore, even though a charge was pend-
ing before the N.L.R.B., undoubtedly the United States Supreme
Court will uphold the state court's action in view of the surrounding
circumstances.
In a pending case, the United States Supreme Court is faced with
an interesting decision of the Ohio Supreme Court which affirmed a
trial court decision that an injunction against picketing was within the
jurisdiction of the state court.7 7 Here the business of the picketed
employer did .not meet the N.L.R.B.'s standards. The theory of the
Ohio court was that the picketing was contrary to state public policy
78
and therefore subject to injunctive restraint where the picketing was
conducted by a minority union for the purpose of compelling recog-
nition by the employer.
If the actions which the various state courts have taken are af-
firmed by the United States Supreme Court, a great step will have
been taken toward eliminating that area in which there is a wrong
without a legal remedy.
VI. Conclusions
From this discussion of cases, one is able to ascertain easily that
the federal government has preempted the field of labor relations in
the area covered by the L.M.R.A. This theory of occupation of a
74. Guss Manufacturing Co. v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 296 P. 2d 733
(Utah 1956).
75. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160(c) (1956).
76. Youngdahl v. Rainfar Inc., 288 S.W. 2d 589 (Ark. 1955).
77. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats Inc., 164 Ohio St. 285, 130
N.E. 2d 237 (1955).
78. Building Service Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1954).
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field by the federal government is not a problem peculiar to the field
of labor relations, but dates back from the early constitutional history
of the United States. Even though Congress has preempted the field
of labor relations, a state may act through its labor board or courts to
enjoin acts of violence. Of course, if the business is expressly exclud-
ed by the L.M.R.A., the state may act without reference to federal
preemption.
The crucial problem which needs solution is the elimination of the
jurisdictional vacuum which is created by the N.L.R.B.'s jurisdiction-
al yardsticks. The present method of solving this problem involves
disturbing and expensive uncertainties during the lengthy process.
These disturbing uncertainties are further complicated by the fact
that the hallmark of an administrative body such as the N.L.R.B. is
discretion. The N.L.R.B. may at its discretion change its jurisdic-
tional standards and its policies as to what best effectuates the policy
of the act. Furthermore the N.L.R.B., the United States Supreme
Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals have been known to trim
their sails to the prevailing political wind, thereby adding to the un-
certainty which exists when a problem is being decided on a case
by case basis.
One solution to this problem which has been proposed is to in-
crease the size and budget of the N.L.R.B. and thereby let it handle
all labor problems affecting interstate commerce. The objection to
this solution is that it would be subject to the criticism of being just
another example of the creeping carpet of federal bureaucracy. It
was to escape this very criticism that the new board in 1953 changed
the jurisdictional standards. However, it seems that the field of labor
relations is one in which one of the paramount objectives should be
uniform regulation by the federal government. It is incongruous that
an act whose purpose was to provide a uniform code for labor-
management relations would create areas in which wrongs could not
be remedied. In this area, the L.M.R.A. is operating to encourage
rathe than discourage industrial strife.
Only Congress can solve this dilemma. A suggested solution is
that the size of the N.L.R.B. be increased as indicated above and the
L.M.R.A. be amended to permit a state to act when jurisdiction is de-
clined by the N.L.R.B. because the flexible jurisdictional standards
are not met. In this manner, means would be available for legal
remedies to wrongs and essential uniformity would be preserved.
WILLIAM C. PA=LR.
21
Parler: Some Aspects of the Problem of Federalism in the Field of Labor R
Published by Scholar Commons, 1957
